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Susanne Schmeidl 
At an Early Warning Conference on 
15-17 March 1997 in Toronto, Ontario 
(see summary in this issue), one of the 
participants appraached me with the 
comment that it was interesting to see 
that the same issues from about ten 
years ago are still being discussed. 
Hearing such a comment makes one 
wonder if we will ever move beyond 
the stage of discussion into the imple- 
mentation of early warning-rapid re- 
sponse and early action. In many ways 
such a prospect is very frustrating; one 
feels in a time trap, doomed to repeat 
history over and over again. 
Yet, while I agree to some extent 
with the comment that early warning 
researchers are still struggling with 
similar issues as several years ago, I 
would argue that a shift has occurred. 
In the early years of early warning, the 
focus was not really on preventive ac- 
tion before the outbreak of a crisis, but 
more on early warning for preparing 
responses after a crisis has occurred 
and cleated refugees. Thus, while we 
may struggle with similar issues that 
in many ways are linked to the defini- 
tion of early warning, changes have 
nevertheless occurred (see also the ar- exotic topic discussed only by a few 
tick by Howard Adelman on the his- individuals. Early waming has gone 
tory of early warning). mainstream. This has led to an explo- 
One of the most important changes sion of individuals and organizaticms 
is that early warning is no longer an that do early waming,orredefine their 
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own work as early warning. In addi- 
tion, many more governments now 
ponder the issue of early warning and 
consider the creation of special units 
(see the proposal by Andreas 
Kohlschiitter and Giinther Bachler to 
the Swiss government). On the one 
hand, I welcome this intense focus on 
early warning, since the topic deserves 
thorough consideration. On the other 
hand, I see the "early warning boom" 
as somewhat harmful to the cause. 
There is a German saying that "too 
many cooks spoil the soup," particu- 
larly if they disagree what the soup 
should look and taste like. Similarly, 
too many approaches to early warning 
will merely add to the confusion of the 
issues, lead to duplication, contradic- 
tions, and ultimately competition over 
scare resources. This is not what early 
warning should be about. Early warn- 
Quantitative and qualitative analysis 
is still done separately, and only a few 
efforts combine both. As briefly 
touched upon in an article in the last 
special issue of Refuge on early warn- 
ing, the ideal would be to combine both 
methods, and our research should fo- 
cus on achieving this goal. 
Yet, despite all these advances, we 
still hit strong resistance in policy cir- 
cles when it comes to early warning. 
The most widely used argument as to 
why early warning cannot be pursued 
is that there is a lack of political will, 
which we are unable to change regard- 
less of our advances in information 
gathering, sharing and analysis. This 
argument, however, is an easy resig- 
nation: it cannot be done, so we will 
not do it. The world would never have 
seen some of its greatest inventions if 
certain inventors and scientists had 
. . . the h i t s  of past early warning eflorts and research are now 
visible. I would make the argument that informution now is readily 
available to users. Thunks to the World Wide Web and electronic 
networks, information is at our fingertips. 
ing, by definition, has to do with coop- 
eration and the sharing of information. 
Therefore, it is important in this ever- 
growing field to seek collaboration 
among the different parties doing 
early warning. This issue of Refuge 
provides two such examples: the Fo- 
rum on Early Warning and Early Re- 
sponse (FEWER) and the Burundi/ 
Great Lakes Policy Forum (Barnett 
Rubin and Fabienne Hara). 
Nevertheless, the fruits of past early 
warning efforts and research are now 
visible. I would make the argument 
that information now is readily avail- 
able to users. Thanks to the World 
Wide Web and electronic networks, 
information is at our fingertips. Recent 
developments in search engines, and 
more importantly, computerized cod- 
ing, have even facilitated the intake of 
the surplus of information in order to 
avoid an overload. While we have 
made advances in the research of early 
warning, we are still falling short of 
merging different approaches in order 
to obtain the most complete picture. 
resigned themselves so easily. What- 
ever happened to the human spirit of 
pushing ahead and producing change? 
Has the world turned all of us into 
couch potatoes willing to observe 
events, but too hesitant and lazy to 
become actors? 
I agree with those who argue that 
political will can be created. After all 
we know the CNN effect, when out- 
side pressure "makes up the mind" of 
politicians to do something. If CNN 
can do it, then aimed and structured 
analysis with policy options should 
also be able to do it. The latter has the 
advantage of providing clear policy 
options based on thorough analysis, 
while the CNN effect merely plays on 
sentiments. 
In addition, why not try early warn- 
ing and see how it works? Of course we 
still need to learn much about its im- 
plementation and what action is best 
to take. Nevertheless, without trying- 
and I mean systematically not ad hoc- 
we will never know if it will work. So 
far, early warnings have been ignored 
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for mmy reasons. It seems we have approach early warning. Despite sur- 
tried sb many things that have not veying academic, UN, and NGO ef- 
worked, so why not give early warn- forts in early warning, as well as 
ing a shot? If policymakers are so sure providing some critical comments, cer- 
about iits failure, they should at least tain areas remained untouched. One of 
amass some empirical evidence for this the most important areas, as should be 
position. But perhaps policymakers apparent from the discussion so far, is 
So far, early warnings have been ignored for many reasons . . . If 
policymakers are so sure about its failure, they should at least 
amass some empirical evidence for this position. But perhaps 
pslicynuakem are afiaid that early warning may actuaUy work 
lMn, they would have to respond to something they may not want 
to respond to. Ajler all, was it not a policy refionale that human 
lives are dispensable for the greaterpolitical good? 
are afraid that early warning may actu- 
ally work. Then, they would have to 
respond to something they may not 
want to respond to. After all, was it not 
a policy rationale that human lives are 
dispelusable for the greater political 
good? Are policymakers afraid that we 
may adtuae be able to change events 
on the ground? Would it be such a bad 
thing tlo live in a world without con- 
flict? Qr are policymakers afraid they 
could put themselves out of business? 
After all, the more conflict, the more 
necessity to monitor, work on policy 
optiom, provide aid, etc. Surely, there 
must be justifications for policymak- 
ers other than going from crisis to crisis 
and emergency to emergency. Some 
might criticize me for straying from my 
area of knowledge. But I do know that 
crises an be prevented if we do it right, 
and that conflict and human suffering 
are in most cases avoidable and unnec- 
essary. I disagree very much with the 
notion that human lives are dispensa- 
ble, and I am sure that policymakers 
would too if it was their life (or that of 
family) at stake. As much as I hate to 
use the Nike slogan, it seems to fit 
when it comes to early warning: We 
have come a long way, so "Let's just 
do it!" 
Abwt a year ago, I edited the first 
special issue of Refuge on early warn- 
ing. While compiling this issue, it be- 
came readily apparent that one edition 
alone may not be enough to provide 
even a glimpse of the different ways to 
the link between early warning and 
early action. This particular link can 
make or break early warning in the 
eyes of many. After all, what good is it 
to know, if one cannot act. Therefore, 
early action or early response (or even 
preventive response) seems to be an 
inherent component of early warning, 
although the latter evolution only ap- 
peared in the past ten years. The article 
by Howard Adelman provides an his- 
torical overview of how early warning 
and the perception of early warning 
have evolved. This article is very im- 
portant for an understanding of the 
meaning of early warning. It may also 
aid in clearing up certain rnisunder- 
standings about early warning that 
arise from different definitions. 
This link between early warning 
and action is also explored in the two 
NGOperspectives that add to that pro- 
vided in the last special issue of Refuge. 
The two articles do not simply provide 
a description of activities; one empha- 
sizes how early warning is perceived 
by NGOs and linked to early action 
(the article by Kate Whidden); while 
theother provides a concrete approach 
on how .the resources of NGOs can be 
pooled together for continuous early 
warning and monitoring of conflict 
areas, with the ultimate goal to impact 
on the activities on the ground (article 
by Rubin and Hara). 
While the last specla1 issue provided 
some critical commentary on early 
warning in Europe, this subject is not 
specifically dealt with here. Moreover, 
no government approach was sur- 
veyed. Rather, this issue has a special 
section on European perspectives 
which includes an article by 
Kohlschutter and Bachler on the pro- 
posal of an early warning system for 
the Swiss government, and an article 
by Julie Fournier on the state of conflict 
prevention in France. Both articles are 
complementary, with Switzerland be- 
ing a very small country with a long 
history of neutrality, and France being 
a very big country with a long history 
of interventionism and power politics 
in Africa. The two articles provide a 
perfect example of the constraints and 
challenges such different countries 
face when struggling with the issue of 
early warning. 
Finally, rather than updating the 
directory of early warning (which is 
still in the works), I decided to include 
some more detailed information on a 
very new consortium on early warn- 
ing-The Forum on Early Warning 
and Early Response, and a brief report 
on a recent conference in early warn- 
ing. Both efforts in a way pool the dif- 
ferent perspectives together. FEWER 
comprises UN, NGO and academic 
members (with governments in a con- 
tact group), while the conference at- 
tempts to survey all spheres of early 
warning, challenges to it, and ways to 
overcome diversity in order to reach 
synergy. 
1 hope this issue of Refuge will not be 
perceived as a repetition of old issues, 
but rather as an introduction to new 
perspectives. We need to keep the fo- 
cus on early warning and continue to 
try to convince policymakers to act. In 
addition, we need to pool our re- 
sources towards a joint effort of early 
warning and early response, so that we 
can look back ten years from now with 
the satisfaction of knowing that we 
have come a long way indeed. 
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